THE GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR OLIGOPOLISTIC TRANSIT MARKET WITH ELASTIC DEMAND

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

2005

Subject Area

planning - methods, land use - planning, ridership - commuting, ridership - demand, policy - fares, organisation - regulation, place - urban

Keywords

Urban transit, Stackelberg form, Sensitivity analysis, Project planning, Programming (Planning), Network analysis (Planning), Nash game, Heuristic methods, Fares, Equilibrium methods (Structural analysis), Deregulation, Algorithms

Abstract

In this article, a transit network is described by a set N of transfer stations (nodes) and a set S of route sections (links). The transit route is also referred to as a path. The authors present a bilevel transit fare equilibrium model for a deregulated transit system. The authors demonstrate that there is a generalized Nash game between transit operators, which is formulated as a quasi-variational inequality problem. The bilevel transit fare equilibrium problem is presented in the Stackelberg form and solved by a heuristic solution algorithm based on a sensitivity analysis approach. In the Stackelberg form, the transit operators dominate the decision-making process and the passengers' response is represented explicitly. The authors include a numerical example to show the competition mechanism on the transit network. The authors conclude that, according to their numerical analysis, the transit operators can achieve competitive advantages by improving their service quality, which is beneficial to passengers.

Comments

Transportation Research Part B Home Page: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615

Link to Full Text

Share

COinS