FARES AND TOLLS IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM WITH TRANSIT AND HIGHWAY: THE CASE WITH TWO GROUPS OF COMMUTERS
ridership - mode choice, ridership - commuting, policy - fares, economics - pricing, mode - mass transit
Travel time, Travel behavior, Transit riders, Transit, Road transportation, Rates, fares and tolls, Public transit, Pricing, Mode share, Mode choice, Modal split, Modal choice, Mass transit, Local transit, Journey time, Highway transportation, Commuting, Commuters, Choice of transportation, Automobile use, Automobile usage, Automobile travel
This paper examines pricing and modal split in a competitive mass transit/highway system with heterogeneous commuters. Two groups of commuters that differ in their disutility from travel time, schedule delay, and transit crowding select the transit or auto mode for traveling from a residential area to a workplace. Three pricing schemes are compared: the marginal cost-based transit fare with no-toll, the average cost-based fare with no-toll, and the marginal cost-based fare with time-invariant toll for subsidizing transit; a socially optimal combination of transit fare and road toll that minimizes the total social cost of the competitive system while ensuring no deficit to the transit side is then derived. The main findings from the analytical and numerical results are presented and discussed.
Huang, H-J, (2000). FARES AND TOLLS IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM WITH TRANSIT AND HIGHWAY: THE CASE WITH TWO GROUPS OF COMMUTERS. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Volume 36, Issue 4, p. 267-284.