A NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN CITY BUS SERVICES
land use - planning, ridership - commuting, organisation - competition, organisation - regulation, place - urban, mode - bus
Urban transportation, Transit operators, Private operators, Private carriers, Network analysis (Planning), Intracity transportation, Intracity bus transportation, Deregulation, Bus transportation (Intracity), Bus transit
This paper presents a new model for a deregulated transportation system with full representation of the city network. The author assumes the case in which a few private bus companies provide the totality of the urban transportation services. Each private company is assumed to have exclusive rights to operate a particular transit line. Competition among companies is given only in terms of the frequency of service as demand and transit fares are considered exogenous. The bus operators seek profit maximization whereas passengers look for the travel strategy that minimizes expected travel time. At equilibrium, marginal revenue should equal marginal cost for each operating company and, for each origin-destination pair, travel 'strategies' for passengers should be optimal.
Zubieta, L, (1998). A NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN CITY BUS SERVICES. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Volume 32, Issue 6, p. 413-422.
Transportation Research Part B Home Page: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615