Bus drivers in competition: A directed location approach
mode - bus, ridership - drivers, ridership - behaviour, planning - safety/accidents, economics - fare revenue
Transport, Bus, Location games, Nash equilibrium, Mixed Strategies
We present a directed variant of Salop’s (1979) model to analyze bus transport dynamics. Players are drivers competing in both cooperative and non-cooperative games. Utility is proportional to the total fare collection. Competition for picking up passengers leads to well documented and dangerous driving practices that cause road accidents, traffic congestion and pollution. We obtain theoretical results that support the existence and implementation of such practices, and give a qualitative description of how they come to occur. In addition, our results allow to compare the current competitive system with a more cooperative one.
Permission to publish the abstract has been given by Elsevier, copyright remains with them.
Herrera, F., & López, S.I. (2022). Bus drivers in competition: A directed location approach. Research in Transportation Economics, Vol. 95, 101220.
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