A game theoretic framework for the robust railway transit network design problem
mode - mass transit, mode - rail, planning - network design
Robust network design, Game theory, Saddle points, Nash equilibrium
This paper proposes a game theoretic framework for the problem of designing an uncapacitated railway transit network in the presence of link failures and a competing mode. It is assumed that when a link fails, another path or another transportation mode is provided to transport passengers between the endpoints of the affected link. The goal is to build a network that optimizes a certain utility function when failures occur. The problem is posed as a non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game with perfect information. The saddle points of the corresponding mixed enlarged game yield robust network designs.
Permission to publish abstract has been given by Elsevier. Copyright remains with them.
Laporte, G., Mesa, J.A., & Perea, F. (2010). A game theoretic framework for the robust railway transit network design problem. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Vol. 44, Issue 4, Pp. 447-459.