Analyzing the structure of informal transit: The evening commute problem
organisation - competition, organisation - performance, mode - bus, place - africa, ridership - commuting, ridership - mode choice
Informal transit, Competition, Regulation
Through the use of a profit-maximizing continuum approximation model, this paper systematically analyzes the development and structure of informal transit systems as a function of the network, user, and modal characteristics. This study examines the evening commute problem along a linear corridor where passengers originate uniformly from a central business district and have destinations uniformly distributed along the corridor. Informal transit drivers who are profit-maximizing will be compared against the traditional case of coordinated, government service that aims to maximize the total welfare. Policies, such as fare regulation and vehicle licensing schemes, will be presented to help rationalize informal transit service using a government-operated service as the baseline.
Permission to publish the abstract has been given by Elsevier, copyright remains with them.
Chavis, C., & Daganzo, C.F. (2012). Analyzing the structure of informal transit: The evening commute problem. Research in Transportation Economics, Article In Press, Corrected Proof.
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