Electric bus transition with leasing companies: An evolutionary game theory approach

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

2025

Subject Area

mode - bus, infrastructure - vehicle, economics - subsidy

Keywords

electric buses (EBs), subsidy, leasing companies, bus operators

Abstract

Many governments have implemented policies to promote the adoption of electric buses (EBs) due to their environmental benefits. However, declining government subsidies, driven by falling battery costs and increased EB availability, have led bus operators to collaborate with leasing companies to mitigate financial burdens. To address this issue, this study makes the first attempt to develop a tripartite evolutionary game model that dynamically captures government-operator-leasing company interactions, where leasing companies are introduced to address operator financing constraints and accelerate fleet electrification. The Evolutionarily Stable Strategy conditions are identified based on the Jacobian matrix to analyze the interaction between stakeholders. Numerical simulations show that: 1) tripartite cooperation is enhanced by increasing subsidies to leasing companies under a fixed total subsidy; 2) lower interest rates lead bus operators to prefer owning EBs, while leasing companies invest in EBs; 3) appropriate annual service fees are crucial in influencing the strategic choices of both leasing companies and bus operators.

Rights

Permission to publish the abstract has been given by Elsevier, copyright remains with them.

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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0967070X

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