An incentive-based optimizing strategy of service frequency for an urban rail transit system

Authors

Changle Li
Jiao Ma
Tom H. Luan
Xun Zhou
Lei Xiong

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

2018

Subject Area

place - asia, place - urban, mode - rail, mode - subway/metro, operations - frequency, operations - crowding, economics - operating costs, planning - service level, planning - service quality, planning - travel demand management

Keywords

Urban rail transit, Service frequency, Incentive strategy, Stackelberg game

Abstract

The service level of urban rail transit is very much affected by the service frequency. This paper proposes an optimizing strategy of service frequency to achieve a tradeoff between service quality and operating cost. Then, an incentive strategy is introduced into the optimizing process of service frequency, to motivate part of passengers to shift their trips from peak to off-peak periods, eventually mitigating the crowdedness and discomfort. Finally, numerical experiments based on a city’s metro in China are performed and the results demonstrate that the proposed strategy can significantly improve the riding experience and decrease the operating cost.

Rights

Permission to publish the abstract has been given by Elsevier, copyright remains with them.

Comments

Transportation Research Part E Home Page:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/13665545

Recommended Citation

Li, C., Ma, J., Luan, T.H., Zhou, X., & Xiong, L. (2018). An incentive-based optimizing strategy of service frequency for an urban rail transit system. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Vol. 118, pp. 106-122.